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Abstract 
The disposition effect postulates that individuals hold losing investments too long. 
However, many investors eventually sell at a loss. This paper integrates prospect theory, 
reference point adaptation and cognitive-experiential self-theory to provide more insight 
on such investor’s capitulation. We empirically study the contribution of each 
component as well as their inter-relationships in two dynamic experiments. Consistent 
with utility maximization, we find a major effect of positive expectations. Second, a 
larger total loss size and a longer time in a losing position are related to a downward 
shift in the reference point. The dynamically adapting reference point indirectly 
increases the probability to capitulate. Also, a recent loss leads to more negative 
emotions, which also indirectly increases the probability to capitulate. 
 
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, D81. 
Keywords: investments; adaptation; reference point; capitulation; selling decisions; 
disposition effect; financial markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent JCR paper Zhou and Pham (2004) point out that consumer financial behavior 
is understudied in the field of consumer research. One of the most intriguing phenomena 
in decision making under risk, particularly in financial markets, is the disposition effect. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) propose that investors tend to hold their losers (depreciated 
investments) too long and sell their winners (appreciated investments) too soon. This 
proposition has received empirical support both in the laboratory setting (Weber and 
Camerer 1998) and in the market place (Odean 1998). Odean analyzes individual 
trading accounts from a large discount brokerage house and finds investors sell winners 
1.6 times more often than losers. The prominent explanation for the disposition effect is 
based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory posits that the 
influence of a gain or loss on wealth is not measured in absolute terms. Rather, the 
perceived value of each outcome depends on its distance to a reference point. Thus, 
when facing a paper gain, investors tend to be risk-averse and choose the less risky 
option by selling the winners. By contrast, when facing paper losses investors tend to 
choose the risky option and keep on to the losers.  
Prospect theory, however, is relatively silent about the dynamic aspect of 
financial decision-making. For example, it tells us little about why many investors 
eventually do capitulate on their loosing investments if the losses accumulate too much 
or extend over too long a period. We address this gap in the existing literature by 
proposing a dynamic model for investor decision-making. The model disentangles the 
effects of time in a losing position and size of loss on reference point adaptation by 
combining different theories in this field. Adaptation of the reference point (from 
prospect theory) is modeled as a change in the adaptation level (from adaptation level 
theory), which is influenced by the time and size of each stimulus. These two building 
blocks are linked to investors’ emotions using the framework of cognitive-experiential 
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self-theory, which suggests there are two systems in decision-making: experiential and 
rational. 
We extend the results of a recent study by Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang and Lim 
(2008). They show that investors adapt to financial gains and losses as their reference 
point shifts after the value of the investment changes. The focus in their study is a single 
value change. In practice, however, individuals are faced with a chain of decision 
moments: the decision to hold on to an investment today may account for the fact that 
one can reconsider this decision tomorrow. To understand how investors’ deal with 
these multiple decision moments, it is necessary to understand how the reference point 
shifts each time new information is received by the decision maker. We examine this 
issue by carrying out two dynamic investment experiments. We study how shifts in the 
investor’s reference point influence this individual’s emotions and expectations about 
the investment’s future performance. The different effects are combined to investigate 
their influence on the final decision to hold on to or to capitulate on a losing investment. 
Our main contribution is the integration of prospect theory, reference point 
adaptation theory and cognitive-experiential self theory in order to explain why 
individuals eventually do sell losing investments, despite the disposition effect. We find 
a major effect of positive expectations on the decision to hold. This is in line with 
(rational) expected utility maximization. Second, a larger total loss size and a longer 
time in a losing position are related to a downward shift in the reference point. The 
dynamically adapting reference point indirectly decreases the probability to continue to 
hold the investment via its impact on expectations. Moreover, we find that a recent loss 
leads to more negative emotions, which also indirectly decreases the probability to hold 
the investment, also via its effect on expectations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prospect 
theory, adaptation level theory and cognitive-experiential self-theory. Section 3 
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integrates these three theories and postulates a dynamic model of investor decision-
making. Sections 4 and 5 present our experimental designs and results. Section 6 
concludes and provides implications for future research on the adaptation of reference 
points. 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Prospect theory and reference point dependence  
Prospect theory postulates that investors evaluate outcomes with regard to a reference 
point. This is the salient neutral point on the evaluation scale, at which the slope of the 
value function shows a sharp transition. If the outcome is above (below) this point, it is 
considered as a gain (loss). Furthermore, prospect theory suggests investors experience 
loss aversion: losses impose approximately double the psychological effect of equal-
sized gains. In addition, investors show risk aversion in the gain domain, while risk 
seeking behaviour in the loss domain. This is reflected in concavity of the value 
function above the reference point and convexity below. Concerning the latter, although 
selling a losing investment can prevent one from incurring additional losses, actually 
realizing the loss is psychologically painful. Therefore, investors tend to choose the 
risky option (holding on to the losing investment, i.e. keeping just “paper losses”) in 
order to retain the possibility of avoiding pain. Weber and Camerer (1998) and Odean 
(1998) among many others report empirical support for the tendency of holding losing 
investments.  
A fundamental and non-trivial issue in prospect theory concerns the 
determination of the reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that the 
reference point can be the status quo, but also the expectation or aspiration level, and 
that it is unclear where the reference point actually lies. In financial decision-making, 
there is no consensus which price determines the reference point. Some authors suggest 
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the initial purchase price of an investment (Weber and Camerer 1998; Odean 1998). By 
contrast, the experimental results by Gneezy (2005) suggest investors most likely use 
the historical peak of a stock price as their reference point. Alternatively, Köszegi and 
Rabin (2006) and Yogo (2008) propose that the reference point is one’s expected value 
of the future outcome. In the field of consumer price perception, Lichtenstein and 
Bearden (1989) find that the basis of an internal reference price range remains largely 
unknown, as each consumer may perceive prices and form their basis differently.  
Baucells, Weber and Welfens (2007) point out that in relation to test past prices 
as reference points, there is a wide range of reference point candidates, for instance, 
purchase price, historical peak, weighted averages. One may argue for choosing one 
reference point candidate over another, but since reference point adaptation is a 
subjective experience, it appears that the potential reference points tested by previous 
studies are all valid. Moreover, these reference point candidates (prices) may have high 
correlations with each other in a normal dataset. This makes it even more difficult for 
researchers to disentangle the effects of these reference point candidates. In fact, 
Baucells et al. (2007) suggest that in most previous studies on the disposition effect, 
authors could also have applied an alternative reference point without altering their 
findings. 
Empirically, measurement issues may explain why alternative prices have been 
proposed as reference points. Inferring the reference point from investors’ trading 
behavior or from purchase prices may result in a noisy proxy. Thus, recent studies 
propose alternative ways to elicit reference points. For instance, Baucells et al. (2007) 
asks subjects to report the selling price for which they would feel “neither happy nor 
unhappy”. A limitation of this measure is that participants have to understand the 
concept of indifference and be able to express that psychological state in terms of stock 
prices. Arkes et al. (2008) inquire participants to imagine how happy (sad) they would 
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feel due to a previous gain (loss). In a second step, they ask participants to report how 
much the investment has to appreciate (depreciate) to make them feel equally happy 
(sad). The limitation here is that subjects may have difficulty imagining how they 
precisely would feel about future gains and losses, leading to inaccuracy in their 
estimates. 
Affective forecasting studies demonstrate that people’s predictions of their own 
hedonic reactions to future events are susceptible to errors and biases (Wilson and 
Gilbert 2003). Although people often predict the valence of their emotional reaction 
(good vs. bad), or even the specific emotions (e.g. joy) correctly, they overestimate the 
intensity and duration of their emotional reactions. Another limitation of former studies 
such as Baucells et al. (2007) and Chen and Rao (2002), is that a series of outcomes is 
presented and participants are then asked to report their reference point. The use of this 
type of retrospective evaluation can be highly biased (Freedman, Thorton, Camburn, 
Alwin and Young-DeMarco 1988). Moreover, this methodological approach does not 
allow researchers to observe how reference points change over the course of the study.  
In the experiments reported in this paper, we ask investors to report at what price 
level they would feel satisfied and at what level they would be willing to sell their 
invested security. We choose to measure the adaptation of the reference point through 
these in-direct measures, because the question asked can readily be understood by 
respondents. We conjecture that investors do not lower their goals unless their reference 
point is lowered. By comparing the reported price levels at multiple points in time, we 
are able to infer the extent of adaptation. Previous studies in the management literature 
show that the aspiration level is adaptive and that the current aspiration level is reflected 
in aspiration levels and performance feedback (Mezias, Chen and Murphy 2002). Our 
measure of reference point adaptation requires less cognitive pressure compared to 
previous studies. Given similar outcomes of different operationalizations, we find that 
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such a low cognitive pressure is highly relevant for an experiment in which subjects 
have to provide answers on the adapted reference point for multiple points in time. 
 
2.2. Adaptation of the reference point 
The empirical evidence that investors tend to avoid the realization of losses combined 
with the phenomenon that many investors eventually do sell their losing investments, 
leads to the question what are the precise determinants of this capitulation decision. This 
is particularly of interest in a dynamic setting, where investors can opt to sell or hold 
every time they receive new information about a stock’s performance. We argue that a 
prime candidate determinant of the capitulation decision is the investors’ dynamic 
adaptation to losses. Adaptation is a process in which the effect of a constant or repeated 
stimulus reduces over time. Previous studies have shown that individuals are able to 
adapt to various kinds of losses or other unpleasant situations (Frederick and 
Loewenstein 1999). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that one’s current level of perceived 
wealth is determined by one’s adaptation to past and present stimuli, in a similar way as 
the adaptation level is affected by past stimuli. The adaptation of a reference point is 
also sometimes referred to as a shift of the reference point or an updated reference point. 
All definitions imply that the reference point is not static. Instead, it is affected by 
previous outcomes. As gains (losses) accumulate, reference points adapt upwards 
(downwards). Thus, a subsequent price of a security is judged relative to this adapted 
reference point. Their difference in value becomes an input in the investors’ decision 
process whether to hold on to or to capitulate the investment. Since the perceived value 
of each price level in a time series is dependent on the reference point, it is important to 
get a clear signal of where the reference point lies and how investors adapt.  
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 Chen and Rao (2002) suggest that people immediately but incompletely update 
their reference point after experiencing an event. They find that by holding the 
economic outcome constant, the sequence of events (either loss-followed-by-gain or 
gain-followed-by-loss) affects one’s psychological appraisal of the outcome differently. 
Nonetheless, their study does not account for the dynamics and uncertainties in 
decision-making since outcomes are presented explicitly and evaluated retrospectively. 
Arkes et al. (2008) show adaptation of the reference point exists, and people adapt to 
gains faster than to losses of the same magnitude.  
Adaptation level theory suggests that the perceived magnitude of a stimulus 
depends on its relation to an adapted level that is determined by preceding stimuli. 
According to Helson’s formula (1964), the adaptation level (AL) is the average of past 
stimuli levels, while Xt represents the current stimulus level, and t represents time:  
  

 
 ∑ 	  

	
      (1) 
        By comparing adaptation level theory with prospect theory, we can see that the 
adaptation process is similar to a shift in the reference point along the value function 
proposed by prospect theory. For instance, suppose one initially invests in a stock and 
its share price drops immediately, while the reference point and the adaptation level are 
the initial purchase price. The current change in value is then judged to be a loss. Over 
time, if one adapts to the loss, the adaptation level is the average of the initial price and 
the current price. In the framework of prospect theory, the reference point shifts 
downwards along the value function towards the loss, restoring the investors’ emotional 
state. Later if the stock price bounces back, but only to a level below the initial purchase 
price, investors may already feel pleased again since they perceive the change of price 
to be a gain, although in terms of overall wealth they are still in a losing position. 
Adaptation level theory originates from studies of the sensory systems, e.g. how 
people adapt to weight and pain. Adapting to psychological pain caused by a financial 
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loss is not a purely sensory experience. It is unlikely that investors adapt to losses 
precisely based on Helson’s formula. In fact, his theory has been criticized on several 
issues. Sarris (1967) argued that extreme stimuli do not affect the adaptation level as 
much as Helson (1964) suggested. Parducci (1968) suggested that the judgement of a 
stimulus is influenced by the rank of the stimulus within a group of stimuli.  
In our paper we do not literally follow the original framework of Helson (1964) 
by constraining the adaptation level to be the time average of all past stimuli. Rather, we 
argue that the effects of time and size of the stimulus on the reference point may be 
disentangled separately. More precisely, we argue that the total size of losses affects 
how much the reference point shifts. In addition, it takes time for one to adapt to losses, 
such that the number of occasions over which the total loss has occurred also affects the 
change in the reference point. As such, equation (1) is insufficient in the sense that it 
does not account for the possibly separate effect of time. For example, it does not 
differentiate how a more distant loss experienced 2 years ago and how a more recent 
loss experienced 2 days ago may affect the adaptation level differently. To account for 
this temporal component, Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993) propose the following 
formula to model the adaptation level:  
     1                                            (2) 
Although the parameter α now allows recent stimuli to receive more weight than 
past stimuli, it still does not allow for a full separation of time and stimuli. Our 
contribution to the modelling of adaptation level is that we examine the unique effect of 
time and past stimuli on adaptation level separately to allow for more flexibility at the 
modelling stage.  
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2.3. Dual processes decision-making models 
Although Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out that the location of the reference 
point influences whether an outcome is perceived as a gain or loss, they do not specify 
how adaptation of the reference point is related to decision-making. The standard 
finance and economics literature have produced a large set of rational, descriptive 
models for decision-making. However, they have just limited predictive power. The 
growing body of the behavioral finance literature has highlighted some of the major 
shortcomings of the standard approach: economic agents are not as rational as typically 
assumed. For instance, prior outcomes affect people’s subsequent risky choices (Thaler 
and Johnson 1990), and myopic loss aversion affects investment behavior (Benartzi and 
Thaler 1995). 
Since the rational approach does not fully explain investors’ trading behavior, 
our study adopts the dual processing approach. Instead of solely focusing on the rational 
process, we also consider the automatic/emotional process in financial decision-making. 
That is, the decision-making process can be divided into two parts – intuition versus 
reasoning (see Chaiken and Trope (1999) for overview). Cognitive-experiential self-
theory (Epstein 1994) clearly distinguishes between the experiential system and the 
rational system. The experiential system can automatically and effortlessly process 
information. It also interacts with the rational system as a source of intuitive wisdom 
and creativity. On the other hand, the rational system is a deliberative and effortful 
system, processing at high levels of abstraction and handling long-term delays of 
gratification. However, it is not an efficient system for processing the vast amount of 
information in everyday life. Therefore, the rational approach may only account for part 
of what is going on in the investors’ mind. This may be the reason why the expected 
utility framework sometimes fails to describe or predict actual trading behaviour.  
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Figure 1 demonstrates the application of cognitive-experiential self-theory on 
modelling of investment decisions. Every price change can be seen as stimulus, which is 
processed by the rational system and the experiential system. These systems interact 
with each other; eventually a decision to hold on to or to capitulate an investment is 
produced.      
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
By synthesizing prospect theory, adaptation level theory and cognitive-
experiential self-theory, we argue that when an investor experiences a loss, a new 
adaptation level is created. The value of this new adaptation level lies between the 
original reference point and the value of the loss. This adaptation level can be seen as an 
adapted reference point in the framework of prospect theory. By providing comparison 
to other stimuli (i.e. subsequent changes in stock prices), the adapted reference point 
creates input values to both the rational and experiential systems, and eventually affects 
an investor’s decision to hold or to capitulate on the losing investment.  
 
III. CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
3.1. The effect of loss size and time on reference point adaptation 
Equation (1) implies that the adapted reference point is determined as a recursive 
average of all preceding stimuli. Thus, the adapted reference point is updated at every 
point in time. According to equation (1), we expect the adapted reference point to be 
positively related to the sum of all previous changes in the stock price    , 
and negatively to the number of time points (t). The sum of past stimuli in our setting 
thus collapses to the size of the total loss since t = 0, i.e.,  . As the stock price 
drops more, the size of the total price change becomes more negative and the adapted 
reference point is expected be lower as well. For instance, if a stock’s price starts at $10 
and drops to $8 in the next period, the adapted reference point should equal to 
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($10+$8)/2 = $9. It is important to note that for a losing investment a higher adapted 
reference point actually indicates a smaller extent of reference point adaptation. We do 
not expect that the adaptation process follows the precise dynamics of equation (1), but 
we do expect a significant relationship from the total sum of past stimuli and the elapsed 
time to the final adapted reference point. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1:  A larger total loss and a longer time in a losing position predict a lower 
adapted reference point.  
We model the effect of total loss and time on adaptation as: 
 ALt     ·     ·                                                  (3) 
where AL denotes the adapted reference point, t the time in a losing position, and  
the size of the total loss. Instead of having one parameter for the average loss (based on 
equation (1)), this model consists of two parameters  and . Thereby, we disentangle 
the unique effects of time in a losing position and size of total loss. The model in (3) is a 
generalization in our setting of Helson’s adaptation level theory in equation (1).  
 
3.2. A dynamic model of investment decision-making 
In this section we link the adaptation of the reference point, through its effect on the 
rational and experiential systems, to the capitulation decision. As a first step, we look 
into the relation between the adapted reference point and the expectation about a stock’s 
future performance. In the field of management, Lant (1992) shows that models applied 
to expectation formation are also useful for describing aspiration formation. Cyert and 
March (1963) suggest an organizations’ aspiration level is determined by what is 
deemed possible. The perception of what is possible results from the organizations’ 
desires. Thus, there is a positive relation between goals and expectations. 
  We conjecture there is also a relation between an investor’s adapted reference 
point (investment goal) and this person’s expectation about the stock’s future 
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performance. That is, when an investor adapts to experienced losses, this person’s 
adapted reference point is lowered, while at the same time her/his expectations about the 
stock’s future performance also changes. Second, we examine the relation between size 
of the previous loss and emotion. Since it takes time for investors to adapt to losses, we 
anticipate that the size of the most recent loss affects the emotions of most investors. 
We have no theoretical grounds to suggest any effect of the most recent loss on the 
expectation of the security’s future performance. The gambler’s fallacy (Ayton and 
Fischer 2004) would suggest individuals experience a negative recency when presented 
with a random sequence, which means that investors may expect the stock price to 
bounce back. By contrast, findings on the hot-hand-fallacy (Ayton and Fischer 2004) 
suggest individuals could also expect a positive recency.  
In a next step we address the relation between expectation and emotion to the 
decision to hold or capitulate the investment. From a standard finance point of view, it 
is only rational to sell a (losing) investment when one does not expect its price to go up 
sufficiently in the future to off-set the risk of the investment. As proposed earlier, a 
lower adapted reference point predicts less optimistic expectations, which is positively 
related to the tendency to capitulate on a losing investment according to a rational 
agent’s perspective. We thus hypothesize that a lower adapted reference point is related 
to a stronger tendency to capitulate. On the other hand, Shiv et al. (2005) found that 
when compared normal participants to patients with stable focal lesion in brain regions 
related to emotion, the normal participants were more likely than the patients to avoid 
risks and not to invest further when they have incurred previous loss or gain. Perhaps 
investors who experience more negative emotion from their losses are more likely to 
choose to riskless option, i.e. to capitulate the losing investment. Since the experiential 
and rational systems interact, negative emotions induced by large previous losses are 
related to the cognitive processes in the rational system. Therefore, we expect that 
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previous losses not only predict less positive emotions, but also predict less optimistic 
expectations, which relates to the investor’s stronger tendency to capitulate.  
Thus, the effect of the adapted reference point and previous losses on the 
decision to hold or to capitulate on an investment, through their respective influence on 
expectation and emotion, is stated formally as follow: 
H2a:  A lower adapted reference point predicts less optimistic expectations 
about the losing investment. 
H2b:  In turn, less optimistic expectations lead to a larger probability of 
capitulation.    
H3a:  A larger previous loss predicts a less positive emotion towards the losing 
investment. 
H3b:  In turn, less positive emotions lead to a larger probability of capitulation. 
This implies that the effect of the adapted reference point on an investor’s 
expectations and the effect of loss since the previous period on emotions are modelled 
as follow:  
           ·                                 (4)   
and                                
        ·                           (5) 
 where EX denotes the expectation, AL is the adapted reference point, E is emotion,  and 
 denotes the previous loss.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We argue that the process of capitulation takes place as follows: when an 
investor adapts to losses, his or her adapted reference point is lowered. As the adapted 
reference point drops, the investor’s expectations about the stock’s future performance 
decreases as well.  As it is only rational to hold a currently losing investment if the 
investor expects a bounce-back in the stock’s future price, we anticipate that if the 
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investor’s expectations of the future stock price development become excessively 
pessimistic, he or she is likely to capitulate this losing investment. On the other hand, as 
we assume the psychological impact of total losses diminishes over time, we do not 
expect any effect of total loss on emotion, but we do anticipate that losses from previous 
periods lead to less positive emotions. As the rational and experiential systems interact, 
previous losses are also expected to predict pessimistic expectations and a higher 
tendency to capitulate. The effect of the adapted reference point, previous losses, 
emotions and expectations regarding the further holding or capitulation decision on the 
investment is modelled as: 
                  /      ·   ·     ·  ·                          (6) 
where H  denotes holding, C capitulating, AL the adapted reference point, EX the 
expectation,  the loss since the previous period, and E emotion.  
 
IV. EXPERIMENT 1 
4.1. Introduction 
This experiment tests the prediction that adaptation to losses affects investors’ decision 
to hold on to or to capitulate a losing investment. Respondents were presented with a 
stock and they have to make multiple decisions of whether to hold or sell such 
investment. The amounts and timing of losses varied across respondents. It is predicted 
that, a larger total loss and a longer time in a losing position predict a lower adapted 
reference point. The adapted reference points, together with the change of stock price 
since previous period, are then processed by the rational and experiential systems. 
Participants with pessimistic expectation and negative emotions are expected to be more 
likely to capitulate.    
4.2. Method 
In our first experiment, 111 students at a large university in The Netherlands (72 male, 
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39 female) participated, with a chance to win a €100 prize by enrolling in a lottery. 
Regarding their investment experience, 44% of the subjects reported to have some 
general experience in investing in financial markets, while 36% of the overall 
participants had experience investing in stocks. Participants arrived at the lab and were 
assigned to individual cubicles. They were presented with the scenario that they recently 
started investing in a single stock – stock X. The amount invested in stock X was 
predetermined and equal for every investor. We specified up to 10 investment periods in 
the experiment. After each period, participants received information on the stock’s 
performance and were asked to hold or sell the stock. They could only choose to sell or 
to hold the whole invested amount. Before deciding to hold or sell, they answered a 
short questionnaire.  
All participants incurred losses with their investment in stock X. With random 
assignment, participants first received 5%, 10%, 20% or 40% maximum losses, and 
these losses were incurred during a losing period of 1, 3 or 5 periods. Next the 
participants who were still holding the stock experienced a flat price period (up or down 
stock price movements by a maximum of 1%) of either 2 or 4 periods. After that, a 
second loss of 5%, 10% or 15% took place, after which the experiment ended. In total, 
we specified 72 possible price change patterns: 4 (loss size: 5%, 10%, 20% or 40%) x 3 
(losing period: 1 vs. 3 vs. 5 periods) x 2 (flat period: 2 vs. 4 periods) x 3 (second loss: 
5% vs. 10% vs. 15%). We used this design because it consists of larger variations of 
price changes for each participant. This provides a suitable basis for disentangling the 
effects of time in a losing position and size of the loss.  
We derived five measures based on Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004); Arkes et al. 
(2008); Ayton and Fischer (2004). The investment goal was reflected by two measures. 
The first measure assesses the satisfy price of investors: “In the next period, what is the 
price of stock X that would make you feel satisfied?” (mean = 32.75, s.d. = 5.35). The 
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second measure is an estimate of the selling price: “In the next period, if the stock price 
increases, what is the price you would sell at?” (mean = 35.64, s.d. = 6.26). The third 
measure assesses the participants’ feelings for the experiential system: “How does the 
performance of stock X make you feel?” Answers are reported on a 9-point scale (1 = 
very bad, 9 = very good), (mean = 3.84, s.d. = 1.87). The fourth measure assesses their 
expectation for the rational system: “How do you think the price of stock X will change 
in the next period?”; answers were also reported on a 9-point scale (1 = surely decrease, 
9 = surely increase), (mean = 5.68, s.d. = 1.66). Our final measure indicates whether 
participants chose to hold on to or to capitulate their losing investment: “Do you want to 
hold or sell stock X now?” (frequency of hold = 497, frequency of capitulate = 55). Our 
measure of the reference point requires some additional discussion. We argue that 
investors have a specific investment goal. For example, one may expect the price of a 
stock to increase from $30 to $35. This $5 increase is required to provide a positive 
psychological value to the investor. Thus, we asked subjects what stock price in the next 
time period would make them feel satisfied (satisfy price). We also asked them at what 
price they would sell the stock, assuming that the stock will appreciate over the next 
period (selling price). These two prices serve as our investment goal measures.  
The investment goal measures are used to estimate the adapted reference point, 
as in Arkes et al. (2008). To illustrate, if the adapted reference point at  is  and the 
satisfy price is ! , the difference between  and ! should be the same as the 
difference between  and ! at , assuming that the shape of the prospect theory 
value function remains unchanged:  
! -  = ! –      ∆ AL =  –  = ! – !                       (7) 
For example, if one participant reports a satisfy price at $37 at  and $35 at , 
the adapted reference point is expected to have shifted $2 downwards. Although neither 
the satisfy price nor the selling price is the reference point per se, by holding the 
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prospect theory value function constant, any difference in the adapted reference point is 
reflected by the difference between satisfy price and selling price. Thus, by keeping 
track of the differences in satisfy price and selling price over the course of the 
experiment, we capture the movement of the adapted reference point. We argue that this 
is a suitable means for measuring the adapted reference point since we make use of an 
experimental setting in which subjects actually experience the losses, instead of just 
imagining losses (gains) as in previous studies. As mentioned earlier, the low cognitive 
load is relevant in eliciting answers for measuring the adapted reference points. Thus, 
we believe that asking for satisfy selling prices is more understandable to the subjects 
than indifferent prices  as in Baucells et al. (2007), or asking for the price subjects 
would feel equally happy (sad) about due to a previous gain (loss) as in Arkes et al. 
(2008).   
 
4.3. Results 
The partial least squares (PLS) approach was used for the analysis. Only the adapted 
reference point has two measures. The remaining variables have only one measure, such 
that reliability and validity tests are not applicable. A total of 552 decisions were pooled 
and analysed together. Structural coefficients were computed (see Figure 3). Standard 
errors and significance were estimated using the bootstrapping method, with 500 
bootstrapping runs.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 indicates that statistically significant effects were observed from the 
time in a losing position and the size of total price change on reference point adaptation. 
Participants reported both a lower satisfy price and selling price, that is, their adapted 
reference points had shifted downwards more strongly when total price change became 
more negative (beta = 0.355, t = 8.187, p < .001) and time in losing position increased 
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(beta = -0.081, t = 1.996, p = .046). These results give strong empirical support to our 
hypothesis 1, i.e., size of total price change and the time in a losing position are 
negatively related to investors’ adapted reference points. 
To test the hypotheses 2a and 3a, the effects of an adapted reference point on 
investors’ expectations and previous price changes on emotions were examined. A 
higher adapted reference point (higher satisfy and selling prices) predicts more 
optimistic expectations about the stock’s future performance (beta = 0.156, t = 3.445,    
p < .001), while previous price changes also affect investors’ expectation of the stock’s 
future performance (beta = 0.185, t = 4.006, p < .001). Moreover, negative previous 
price changes are related to negative emotions (beta = 0.432, t = 12.053, p < .001), 
while the adapted reference point does not significantly predict emotions (beta = 0.065, 
t = 1.898, p = .06). These results give support to our hypotheses 2a and 3a, i.e. the 
adapted reference point is positively related to one’s optimistic expectations, and larger 
previous losses lead to less positive emotions.  
To test hypotheses 2b and 3b, we examine the relation among emotion, 
expectation and the decision to hold or capitulate on a losing investment. We find  less 
optimistic expectations about the stock’s future performance are positively and 
significantly related to the tendency to capitulate stock X, (beta = -0.277, t = 6.777, p <. 
001, with 0 = hold, 1 = capitulate), while more positive emotions do not significantly 
predict a stronger tendency to hold (beta = -0.034, t = 1.037, p = .30) on to the losing 
investment. Thus, hypothesis 2b is supported, but hypothesis 3b is not.  
Logistic regressions were run to test if individual differences (age, sex, fields of 
studies and investment experiences) among subjects affect their tendency to sell. No 
significant effect is found.  
 
4.4. Discussion 
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Contrary to findings of previous studies (Shiv et al., 2005), we do not find a direct effect 
of emotions on the decision to hold or sell a losing investment. We suggest that the 
participants’ experiential system does not produce the final decision directly, but that it 
interacts with the rational system, i.e., when investors feel bad about their losses, their 
expectation becomes less optimistic so that their tendency to capitulate increases. This 
line of reasoning is supported by our empirical results as we find significant evidence of 
interactions between these two systems: positive emotions predict more optimistic 
expectations (beta = 0.242, t = 4.974, p < 0.001), while optimistic expectations also 
predict more positive emotions (beta = 0.205, t = 5.296, p < 0.001). This interaction is 
consistent with experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994).  
Concerning expectations, when the total price change is more negative, 
participants report significantly more optimistic expectations (beta = -0.258, t = 6.016, p 
< .001). This reflects the bounce-back effect, i.e. that the participants expect a fallen 
(risen) stock price to raise (decline) in the future. At the same time, when the previous 
price change is more negative, participants report pessimistic expectations (beta = 
0.185, t = 4.006, p < .001). These findings are in line with our assumption that both the 
gambler’s fallacy and the hot-hand-fallacy may occur. 
The PLS results demonstrate that investors do adapt to losses as their adapted 
reference point shifts downwards over time. Furthermore, larger total losses and a 
longer time in a losing position lead to a lower adapted reference point. Such a lower 
adapted reference point is related to a more pessimistic expectation about the losing 
investment, which predicts a stronger tendency of capitulation. Our empirical results are 
consistent with the findings by Arkes et al. (2008) as investors do adapt to losses. 
However, we contribute that a lower adapted reference point is predicted by a larger 
size of loss and/or a longer time in a losing position. Our empirical results have also 
added more insight into the separate effects of time in a losing position and the size of 
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losses as we have disentangled the unique effect of past stimuli and time in a losing 
position. Our findings support the conclusion of Hardie et al. (1993) that the temporal 
component plays a critical role in (financial) decision-making. 
 
V. EXPERIMENT 2 
5.1. Introduction 
In a second experiment, we aim to test the applicability of the proposed model both in 
the domain of gains and losses. We expect the model to be more relevant for the loss 
domain. Due to the convexity (concavity) of the value function in the domain of losses 
(gains) proposed by prospect theory, the effect of emotions is expected to be opposite in 
these domains. In the gain domain, because of the diminishing marginal value, investors 
are expected to sell the investments after reaching a certain level of positive value 
(positive emotion) derived from their gains. In the loss domain, less positive emotions 
should lead to a larger probability of capitulation (hypothesis 3b). Therefore, a quadratic 
relation is hypothesized. Stronger positive and negative emotions both lead to a higher 
tendency of capitulation. Thus, hypothesis 3b is proposed to be applicable to the loss 
domain only. On the other hand, there are no theoretical grounds to suggest that the 
other hypotheses (1, 2a, 2b, 3a) would be inapplicable in the domain of gains.   
 
5.2. Method 
The experimental method is similar to experiment 1, except that participants were 
randomly assigned to 4 experimental conditions: 2 (price development: gains vs. losses) 
x 2 (volatility regimes: high vs. low). We added high or low volatility conditions into 
the design to introduce some variations of price movements in both gain and loss 
conditions, in order to increase the generalizabilty of our findings.  
Ninety-five students (56 male, 39 female) participated in the experiment in 
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return for cash payment. Participants were paid depending on the profit or loss they 
incurred. Regarding investment experience, 37% of the subjects reported to have some 
experience in investing in financial markets, while 27% of the participants had 
experience investing in stocks.  
There is one more measure for each of the systems. For the rational system, 
apart from participant’s expectations about whether the stock price will increase or 
decrease, we also asked them to report the price that they expect to be most likely in the 
next period (mean = 35.02, s.d. = 9.20).  For the experiential system, apart from feeling, 
we also asked subjects to report their (dis)satisfaction level on a 9-point scale (mean = 
4.72, s.d. = 2.28). We derived these measures from Ferrari and Lozza (2005); 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004). These additional measures were incorporated in 
Experiment 2 in order to allow assessment of the effects of more specific emotions and 
expectations. 
 
5.3. Results 
The PLS analysis was run to estimate the proposed model. In total, 627 decisions were 
collected from 95 subjects, 303 responses from the gain conditions and 324 responses 
from the loss conditions. Two participants did not provide selling price and satisfy price 
at . We applied case wise deletion on the 13 decisions from these participants. 
Structural coefficients were computed, their standard errors and significance were 
estimated with 500 bootstrapping runs. Figure 4 summarizes our empirical findings. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 4 shows there is a significant and positive relation between total price 
change and adapted reference point (beta = 0.214, t = 5.773, p < .001). That is, positive 
(negative) price change leads to higher (lower) satisfy and selling prices. However, time 
does not predict adaptation of the reference point (beta = 0.016, t = 0.617, p = .537). 
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Thus, Hypothesis 1 received partial support. As for hypothesis 2a, a higher (lower) 
adapted reference point predicts more optimistic (pessimistic) expectations about the 
stock’s future performance (beta = 0.112, t = 2.014, p = .044), while previous price 
changes do not affect investors’ expectations of the stock’s future performance (beta = 
0.016, t = 0.483, p = .629). As for hypothesis 3a, positive (negative) previous price 
changes predict more positive (negative) emotions (beta = 0.726, t = 34.348, p < .001); 
higher (lower) adapted reference point also predicts more positive (negative) emotions 
(beta = 0.078, t = 2.531, p = .012). These results give support to our hypotheses 2a and 
3a, i.e. that the adapted reference point is positively related to one’s expectations, and 
previous price changes are positively related to one’s emotions.  
As for hypothesis 2b, our empirical results show that more optimistic 
expectations about the stock’s future performance are positively and significantly 
related to the tendency to hold stock X, (beta = -0.190, t = 2.228, p = .026, with 0 = 
hold, 1 = capitulate). Thus, hypothesis 2b is supported. As for hypothesis 3b, it is found 
that there is a significant linear relation between positive emotions and a stronger 
tendency to sell (beta = 0.112, t = 2.526, p = .012). Nonetheless, the proposed quadratic 
relation between emotion and decision to sell is also found to be statistically significant 
(beta = 0.232, t = 5.297, p <. 001). In fact, the effect size and statistical significance of 
the quadratic relation are stronger than those of the linear relation.  
 
5.4. Discussion 
The overall results of Experiment 2 are largely consistent with those of Experiment 1. 
The adapted reference point is predicted by the total change of price, but not by time. 
Then the adapted reference point predicts an individual’s expectation about the stock 
price and in turn affects the hold/sell decisions. On the other hand, size of previous price 
change affects subjects’ emotions, which in turn affects the decisions. In Experiment 1, 
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hypothesis 3b did not receive support that negative emotions do not significantly predict 
a tendency to capitulate in the domain of loss. However, in Experiment 2, a significant 
quadratic relation is found between emotion and tendency to sell, which implies that 
negative emotion does relate to the tendency to capitulate. However the effect is only 
significant when data from the gain conditions are taken into account as well. One 
possible reason is that since participants’ payoff is around 3 to 5 Euros, which does not 
impose a real financial impact on the subjects, the negative emotion evoked and the 
urge to cut losses is limited.  
            Compared to Experiment 1, the effect of time in Experiment 2 is no longer 
significant. This may be partly due to the price developments in Experiment 2 being 
different from those in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, upward price movements were 
less frequent and the size of upward movement is limited to around 1% of initial price. 
In Experiment 2, however, more frequent and larger upward (downward) movements 
were presented in the loss (gain) conditions. Perhaps the effect of time is more relevant 
when a more obvious trend occurs, a phenomenon more easily recognized by 
individuals in Experiment 1 compared to 2. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
We investigated why most individuals eventually do sell their losing investments, 
despite the disposition effect. We formulated a conceptual model that integrates 
prospect theory, reference point adaptation theory, and cognitive experiential self-
theory. The model is tested using two laboratory experiments. 
Experiment 1 shows a larger loss size and a longer time in a losing position are 
related to a more downwardly shifted adapted reference point. This downward shifted 
adapted reference point leads to less optimistic expectations about the stock’s future 
performance, which predicts a larger likelihood of capitulation. The actual decision to 
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capitulate a losing investment, however, only depends directly on the expectation about 
the stock’s future performance. The adapted reference point affects the actual 
investment decision indirectly via its impact on expectations. Results from Experiment 
2 generally point in the same direction, except that the effect of time on adaptation 
becomes insignificant. We also find that there is a quadratic relation between emotion 
and the decision to sell, implying that both very positive and negative emotions lead to a 
significantly higher tendency to sell. 
Thus, we have demonstrated the link between reference point adaptation and 
(financial) decision-making. Most studies of the disposition effect use various purchase 
prices (e.g. average, FIFO, LIFO) as proxies for the reference point (Odean 1998; 
Weber and Camerer 1998). We provide new implications in measuring the strength of 
the disposition effect by locating the reference points, and. thus contribute to the 
literature in predicting when investors’ capitulation takes place. 
Our experimental findings are consistent with those by Chen and Rao (2002). 
People immediately but incompletely update their reference point after experiencing an 
event. We found the adapted reference point depends on the time spent in a losing 
position. That is, it takes time for investors to fully or at least mostly adapt to a financial 
loss. Moreover, the adapted reference point’s indirect (via expectation) effect on the 
investment decision is in line with models proposed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and 
Yogo (2008) that the reference point is one’s expectation about future outcomes. To 
estimate the expected value of future outcome, one needs to be aware of one’s own 
perceived current state, i.e. adapted reference point. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
investors’ expectation for the stock’s future performance relates to their adapted 
reference point. Our result is also consistent with findings by Odean (1998) and Weber 
and Camerer (1998) that the initial purchase price is an appropriate reference point in 
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investors’ decision-making process, but its significance is stronger right after a security 
is acquired compared to later points in time.  
In sum, the answer to the question on why losing investments are eventually 
sold is that the reference point is adjusted downward when the total losses increase and 
the investor is longer in a losing position. A lower adapted reference point leads to 
lower expectations and hence an increased chance of capitulation. The effect of time-
point on expectations is fully mediated by the adapted reference point change. However, 
this does not apply for the effect of total price change on expectations. Thus, further 
research should address the mechanism linking total price change to expectations using 
other variables besides the adapted reference point. Nevertheless, such research should 
incorporate the adapted reference point next to these other variables. A particularly 
pressing question is when time in a losing has an important role, next to the size of the 
total loss. Our results with regard to time were mixed, although we can conclude that 
there are conditions under which time in a losing position is relevant. Perhaps time in a 
losing position is only relevant in the presence of clear trends, such as those in the 
October 2008 collapse of stock exchange markets or perhaps it also occurs under other 
conditions. The latter is a topic for further investigation.  
The conducted experiments were conducted within a short time frame, while in 
reality investors may have more time in-between receiving each piece of information, 
thus the effect of time cannot be fully examined in such an experimental setting. Future 
studies should try to replicate these findings with larger samples and adopt more natural 
settings. Moreover, finding meaning (learning a lesson) from an experienced loss might 
help people to better adapt (Taylor 1983). We suggest that future studies should test if 
there is a better adaptation when investors have a sufficient time frame to “learn” from 
their experienced losses. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) suggest that there are two 
approaches: the valence-based approach (i.e. overall (dis)satisfaction) and the specific 
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emotions approach, to model impact of emotions on consumer satisfaction and 
behavior. Future studies may investigate how specific emotions, for example, regret and 
disappointment, may affect investors’ capitulation tendency. In addition, recruiting 
participants outside the university environment and/or from the population of 
undergraduates will also increase the validity of the findings.  
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Figure 1. Framework of cognitive-experiential self-theory applies on decision process 
of holding/capitulating on losing investments 
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Figure 2. Proposed model of decision-making in holding/capitulating on losing 
investment 
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .05; *** p < .001; n.s. = not significant. 
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Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .05; *** p < .001; n.s. = not significant.  
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